On the eve of his visit to the U.S., the former Soviet leader reflects on how he lost his job and on his frustrations with Boris Yeltsin

By MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

[(c) 1992 by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, from a book to be published later this year.]

On Dec. 14, in the final days of my tenure as the President of the U.S.S.R., I decided to go to a concert. Claudio Abbado was conducting Mahler's Fifth Symphony in Moscow. That unforgettable evening was the first time I'd heard Mahler's music. For a long time he, just like Wagner, was, as they say, "not welcome" in our country.

Great music is an expression of philosophical reflection and probing. In that particular symphony, there are passages, particularly in the first movement, when the cellos and the violas play together, that shake you to the very core of your being. It's very powerful and moving.

I had the feeling that Mahler's music somehow touched our situation, about the period of perestroika, with all its passions and struggles.

I had come hoping to relax, but I couldn't. Instead, I had a feeling of total immersion in the music. For me it was like a revelation. Raisa Maximovna had the same reaction.

After the concert we met Claudio Abbado. "You know," Raisa Maximovna said to him, "I've been shaken by this music. It left me with a feeling of despondency, a feeling that there is no way out."

The conductor strongly objected. "Oh, no!" he said. "There is a way out!"

He understood the state she was in, so he repeated, "Yes, there is a way."

He was right. If you listen to that overwhelming music, you hear the themes of life and death. There is also light, but against the backdrop of darkness, of tragic struggle. In life there is always conflict and contradiction, but without those there is no life. Mahler was able to capture that aspect of the human condition.

So was Wagner. What a giant! I have to admit that listening to his music doesn't make one more optimistic or confident. Quite the contrary, he adds to one's doubts. But man remains capable of finding a way out of any crisis as long as he is allowed to explore, to think and to be creative.

We used to be hemmed in by the system we had in this country. We were repressed intellectually and forced to conform with stereotypes. That's why Wagner was supposed to be the last thing we needed. Everything had to be as simple and clear as ABC.

I knew that system from within. Essentially, the idea [of perestroika] was to break the backbone of the totalitarian monster. The party was intertwined with the KGB, the government and other organs of state power. Was I afraid of the KGB? No, I had no fear. If I had been afraid, I would not have been able to do anything. But I knew their power! I knew that what I am able to say today, I couldn't have said then. I had to beat them at their game.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once said that following the middle course is the most difficult thing in politics. I can confirm how right he was on the basis of my own experience. There was once a political cartoon that showed me walking a tightrope and carrying two baskets, one filled with leftists and the other with rightists. The leftists are saying, "A little bit more to the left!" and the others are shouting, "A bit more to the right!" It's a good joke, but more important, it accurately reflects the situation I found myself in.

The period roughly between November 1990 and April 1991 [when Gorbachev was maneuvering under pressure from conservative forces] was particularly difficult. There was an escalation in confrontation. Early in 1991 there were rallies and demonstrations in the streets. Troops were called out. The threat of dictatorship was real. I saw an imminent danger. I proposed that the leaders of the republics meet immediately at [a government dacha in] Novo-Ogarevo [a village outside Moscow].

It was the right thing to do, but I now believe we should have done it earlier, in the fall of 1990. It was then that we should have started looking for certain forms of cooperation. We should have held some sort of round-table meetings. We should have closed ranks with the democratic forces so that we could move more rapidly along the path of reform. Had we done so, the question of our statehood [i.e., keeping the country together] would have been handled better and the cost of change would have been lower.

As it was, we lost time.

In the summer of 1991, before leaving Moscow for my vacation, I began to outline an article in which I would analyze the experience of perestroika. After arriving at Foros [in the Crimea], I was going through the books I took with me. One of them was titled October 1917: The Greatest Event of the Century -- or a Social Catastrophe? A parallel immediately came to my mind: pere stroika -- is it a catastrophe or a great event, a breakthrough for the country?

That was the impulse for the article that I set about to write. By Aug. 12, it was finished. So much of it was already in the mind that it was only a matter of committing it to paper.

Then, a week later, came the putsch. The consequences were devastating. The plotters had made it impossible to implement the Anti-Crisis Program [the Gorbachev government's plan to stabilize the country's finances and gradually introduce market mechanisms into the economy]; they made it impossible to continue the reform of the Communist Party. And they also made it impossible to sign the union treaty [which would have kept the country together while granting more power to the individual republics].

The putsch accelerated the disintegration not just of the state but also, more important, of society as a whole. Fully aware of the danger that new situation posed to democratic reform, I considered the resumption of work on the union treaty as my highest priority. That goal determined all my actions.

On Nov. 14, the State Council [composed of leaders of the former Soviet republics] met in Novo-Ogarevo. It was a difficult but fruitful day. The spirited debate focused on the central question: Shall we have a union state or a union of states? It might seem that it was a purely linguistic argument, but behind it was the all-important question of whether we should preserve one country or divide into several countries with all the resulting implications for the issues of citizenship, the economy, science, armed forces, foreign policy and so on. For four hours we talked about this universe of nations living in a vast country. The position of Russia, enunciated by Boris Yeltsin, was that there would still be a union. At the end, we all concluded that the best outcome would be a confederative union state.

Discussion of the union treaty in the parliament was broken off in an atmosphere heavy with emotions verging on panic, fueled in particular by the press in the wake of the Ukrainian referendum. Despite the famous statement Yel tsin had made in Novo-Ogarevo -- "The union will exist!" -- the Russian leadership reversed its position, claiming that Russia had never agreed to a union without Ukraine. But that was just a pretext.

The first days of December were overshadowed by anxiety. On Dec. 1, the people of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to support their parliament's declaration of independence from Moscow. On Dec. 3, the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, called me. We are friends, and as always, our talk was extremely candid.

"Tell me," he asked, "what is actually happening in your country?" In particular, he was interested in my assessment of the situation in Ukraine.

I told him that the referendum was being interpreted there as a vote for secession from the union. Independence and sovereignty were being automatically equated with secession. But that was not so. Other republics were also sovereign and independent, but that by no means put them outside the union. Earlier that same day I had spoken with [Leonid] Kravchuk [the President of Ukraine], and he had assured me that cooperation was still possible. But during his election campaign, he had found himself in the tight embrace of forces that wanted to provoke complete secession from the union. Would he be able to extricate himself? If an attempt was made to break Ukraine away from the union, we could be faced with very dangerous developments there. The separatist forces must not be allowed to use the independence of Ukraine for secession.

I was sure that society would support me, since common sense suggested that it would be wrong to divide up the country. If the U.S.S.R. were to split up, we'd have to divide our armed forces. Ours was a unique defense space, with strategic forces and early-warning systems that monitored the global military situation. There was nothing like it anywhere in the world except in America. Were we really going to rip it apart?

If something like that happened, the [Soviet] military would watch what the politicians are doing and say, "Damn it, this country is in the wrong hands! It's just unbelievable what we've come to!"

All we had to do was look at the situation in Yugoslavia to see where we might be heading. We might get into such a mess that several generations would have to live with the consequences.

Shortly after the Ukrainian referendum, I had a conversation with Yeltsin setting forth the arguments in favor of preserving the union. I found, however, that Yeltsin was not inclined to discuss the substance of this matter. In fact, he really had nothing much to say. He just kept asking me the same question: "Now, what about Ukraine? Can you guarantee that it will join the treaty?"

I bore down on Yeltsin hard, saying that Ukraine could still be drawn into the negotiating process; but in order for that to happen, Russia must first sign the treaty; only then would Ukraine follow suit.

During that period I had contact with Yeltsin almost every day, either on the phone or in my office. We talked about many things, but the most important was still the question of preserving the union. When I asked him why the [Russian parliament] had postponed the debate on the draft of the union treaty, he said something to the effect that the deputies wouldn't support it. But as I pointed out, his experts and mine were working together in an atmosphere of general agreement, so how did he know that the Russian deputies would oppose the treaty?

I realized that the Russian President was dissembling and that the secessionist position taken by the Ukrainian leadership was actually a godsend for him, because it played into his hand as he stalled over the union treaty. He clearly had his own plan in mind.

When Yeltsin was about to go to Mensk [on Dec. 7, to meet with Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich, the leader of Belarus], I asked him bluntly what he was going to propose there. He mentioned the possibility that a union of Slavic republics might come up.

I told him that was unacceptable.

On Sunday, Dec. 9, I had a call from Shushkevich.

"We've reached an agreement," he said, "and I want to read it to you."

I asked him what agreement he was talking about.

"Well," he said, "you know -- it's already been gaining [international] support. We've had a conversation with [President George] Bush."

I stopped him right there: "You've been speaking with the President of the United States of America, and the President of this country knows nothing about it? Shame on you!"

I was flabbergasted. While Shushkevich was telling me what had happened, Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] was on the phone with Bush!

I asked to speak with Yeltsin. When he called on me after his return from Mensk, the conversation was tense.

"You've been off meeting in the woods and shutting down the Soviet Union. Some people in this country even have interpreted it as a kind of political coup, carried out behind the back of the supreme soviets of the republics. The President of the United States learned about all of it before the President of the U.S.S.R.!"

The action taken in Mensk faced the Central Asian republics with a fait accompli. Frankly, it was an insult to their sovereignty and national dignity. As to Ukraine, or more precisely its politicians, everything was clear. Their behavior was in keeping with their objective of ruining the union.

Later I had a talk with Yeltsin and asked him if the independent states were to have their own armies. He said, "Yes, but excluding the strategic forces."

"That means Ukraine will have an army of 470,000 men, right? That's 100,000 men more than the army of the united Germany!"

Despite my profound conviction that Yeltsin, Kravchuk and the others had made a huge mistake, I still had to accept the Commonwealth as a new reality and do what I could to promote the process and keep it as much as possible within a legitimate framework.

The international community was still sympathetic to the idea of preserving the union, but the leaders of the West regarded the Belovezhskaya Pushcha initiative and the principle of commonwealth as reason for hope -- as a step in the direction of preserving our community of nations.

On Dec. 13, in a phone conversation with President Bush, I shared with him my assessments of the situation.

"The Mensk Agreement is just a sketch," I said, "an improvisation. It leaves many questions unanswered. Further discussion of the draft union treaty in the parliaments has been made virtually impossible. The agreements between me and the leaders of the republics have been thrown out the window. The meeting produced a rather facile statement that the union no longer exists. But then that means there are no laws regulating public order, defense, frontiers, international obligations, and so on."

The next day [French President] Francois Mitterrand called, and later I talked with Kohl, [British Prime Minister John] Major and other leaders. They did not hide their concern over the escalating process of disintegration in our country. They were worried not only about nuclear security but also about political and economic implications that posed a threat of instability in Europe and throughout the whole world.

[In mid-December] Bush sent James Baker to the Soviet Union. I told the Secretary of State what I'd already said to the President -- that the Mensk agreement was far too vague to be the basis for the orderly transformation of our country. I added that I did not want to go into the causes of everything that had happened. That was our problem and our responsibility: "There may have been miscalculations and even serious mistakes on my part too, but that's not the point now. I see a role for myself in using the political means available to me to prevent even greater disintegration in the process of creating the Commonwealth of Independent States. Time is running out, and we have to act quickly.

"I want the leaders of the republics to succeed, although I don't believe that they can. Still, I want them to, because if they don't, all that we have accomplished will be in jeopardy. So will the future itself."

Baker stressed that the U.S. Administration was doing everything possible not to let itself be drawn into our internal affairs. He said that the U.S. was interested in an orderly process of transformation.

"We share your view that the Mensk agreement is just a shell," Baker continued. He had already met with Yeltsin, and Baker said he doubted that the Commonwealth could form a common defense structure. "From my talks here," he said, "I can't see how there can be common defense if there are 10 separate foreign policies. Who will give orders to the commander in chief of the joint armed forces?"

"You're right, Jim," I replied. "I anticipated this. My prophecies are beginning to come true very quickly. I've already had to intervene. I've spoken with Kravchuk and Yeltsin several times. Kravchuk has declared himself the commander in chief [of Soviet armed forces in Ukraine]. I can't help being worried. Russia may decide to put its foot down and say it's sick and tired of this whole mess. What then? If the republics do not come to terms, disintegration could escalate, and the result could be dictatorship. The people are in such desperate straits that they might even support a dictatorship. That's why I want the agreement on the Commonwealth to succeed."

Asked by Baker what the Americans should do in that situation, I felt it necessary to say that the most important thing for the Commonwealth was additional food aid. There was a real danger that the situation could get critical and simply explode, sweeping away all governments. "The $5 billion to $10 billion we need to achieve the convertibility of the ruble is peanuts compared with the price we'd all have to pay if everything were to blow up."

On Dec. 19, I received a call from Kohl. Bring me up to date, he said, what is happening? "What will your place be in the future Commonwealth?" he asked. He sounded concerned, even worried, which was quite out of character.

I reiterated my conviction that it was a major political mistake of strategic significance to dismember our state.

Two days later [after 11 republics agreed to join the Commonwealth, sealing the U.S.S.R.'s fate -- and Gorbachev's], I talked to Francois Mitterrand. From his very first words, which were warm and friendly as always, I sensed that he understood what had happened. I informed him that within the next few days I was going to make public my decision to leave the office of the President.

On Dec. 23, at 6 p.m., during a conversation with Yeltsin, I received a call from Major. We had developed very good relations, close on a human level and marked by trust and mutual understanding on a political level.

"We are thinking of you," he said.

"Yes," I replied, "even if I take the most optimistic view of things, developments in our country can only be described as difficult. Here's what I'm thinking: even without the union, we must not let everything that is happening in the country now cause even greater losses for us here and for you. The important thing now is that whatever happens next happens within the framework of a political process, constitutional norms and concord. For the time being, I see no danger that we'll go the way of Yugoslavia. For me, that's what counts most. I hope it's the same for you, John. In the end, life will take care of the rest; everything will fall into place.

"Since noon, already for six hours in a row, I've been talking with Yeltsin. We recognize our shared responsibility to the country and the world to ensure that everything started over the past years be continued. Despite the differences of approach, I will try to help the Commonwealth survive. I want to help Yeltsin. It's not going to be easy for him. I've told him that as long as the democratic changes and reforms continue, I'll support him and defend him from attacks."

Toward the end of our conversation, I said to Major, "I have one request: help the Commonwealth, and above all Russia." Then, in conclusion: "Thank you for your friendship. From me and Raisa Maximovna, our most cordial and warm greetings to Norma."

On Dec. 25, I talked with President Bush. I informed him that in about two hours I would make my final statement [resigning the presidency]. I shared with him my thoughts about the current situation:

"There is no question, George, that the states of the Commonwealth must be recognized. However, I would request that you bear in mind the following: it's very important for Europe and the world to avoid an escalation of contradictions within the Commonwealth. That's why it's so important to support the Commonwealth as an interstate entity, not just its individual members. We must promote cooperation rather than disintegration and destructive processes. This is our common responsibility. I emphasize this point.

"The second point is the need to support Russia, which will bear the brunt of the burden of reforms.

"I have a decree on my desk. Since I'm terminating my responsibilities as commander in chief, I am transferring the right to use nuclear arms to the President of the Russian Federation. I attach great importance to the fact that this aspect is under effective control. The decree will come into effect immediately after my final statement. You may therefore feel at ease as you celebrate Christmas and sleep quietly tonight.

"For my part, I'm not running away to hide in the taiga [forest]. I will remain active in politics and in public affairs. I want to help the processes under way in this country and promote new thinking in world politics."

Here's what George Bush said in reply:

"I'd like to assure you that we will stay involved in your affairs. We will do our best to help, particularly the Russian republic, given the problems that it is now facing and that could get critical in winter."

He concluded by saying, "I hope our paths will soon cross. We will be glad to welcome you, once things settle down, perhaps here in Camp David . . . And so, on this special day of the year, at this historic crossroads, I salute you and thank you for all that you have done for the world. And thank you for your friendship."

"Thank you, George," I said, "and goodbye."

Right after my [farewell] address [to the nation] and a brief press conference, there was a ceremony for the transfer of the so-called nuclear button. Boris Yeltsin refused to attend this act of momentous significance for the state and the world, even though he and I had agreed in advance on the format of the event. I was told that the President of Russia was displeased with my address, that he was angry and refused to show up at the agreed place. He saw fit to propose meeting instead on "neutral ground."

Marshal [Yevgeni] Shaposhnikov [the chief of staff of the Commonwealth armed forces] arrived, along with the officers who provided technical support for the nuclear command system.

There was no other ceremony to bid farewell to the President of the U.S.S.R., as is the custom in civilized countries. Of the Presidents of the sovereign states -- the former republics of the U.S.S.R. -- with whom in most cases I had been linked by many years of close and friendly relations, not one came to Moscow during those days or even called me.

Do I regret having had to leave the post of President? From the very beginning of my time in office, I began deliberately to delegate power. I do not care about power for its own sake. Now that I have a different status, I have far-reaching plans. I have been receiving many offers, including those from my foreign friends, but the focus of my activities will be here, in Russia.

[Martin Luther] King was right: power is transitory, and it's not the best thing to have. Power as such, as "the supreme value" . . . well, I wouldn't have wanted that. I could give it all up. There is another mission: to revive this country, this land that contains a vast world -- long suffering, tormented and demoralized -- to bring it back to normal life, and to restore to its people a feeling of human dignity.